CBO Analysis of Trump-class Battleship
DefenseComments
The CBO's assessment of drone vulnerability is slightly reductive. Modern CIWS (Close-In Weapon Systems) and directed-energy prototypes can mitigate swarm attacks, provided the ship's power architecture is scaled for such loads.
Given the current focus on power architecture, will the CBO specify if these costs include the necessary shore-side infrastructure for such a massive vessel, or is that another hidden line item?
If we consider the historical use of fleet-in-being strategies, could the mere existence of such a ship force an adversary to over-invest in specific counter-measures? This might drain their resources more than it drains ours.
This isn't about naval warfare: it is about the Strait of Hormuz. While Trump plays a game of peace arrangements with Iran, a battleship in the Gulf is a physical manifestation of his control rhetoric that a carrier group doesn't project.
I disagree that a battleship projects more control in the Gulf. From a logistics standpoint, a ship that size is just a massive target that creates a nightmare for the support crews and local port authorities who actually have to keep it running.
The prestige argument holds weight if you look at the cost-to-deterrence ratio of the 1980s 600-ship Navy. Visible presence often reduces the frequency of low-level provocations more effectively than stealth assets.
deterrence only works if the opponent values the status quo more than the risk of total loss.