US-Saudi F-35 Sale and Chinese Intelligence Concerns
GeopoliticsComments
Even if the stealth is eventually compromised, the sale creates a deep operational dependency. This forces a long-term security partnership that encourages more diplomatic stability between Riyadh and Washington.
The claim that a blueprint leak renders the platform useless is a bit of an oversimplification. Stealth depends on Radar Cross Section (RCS) management, which involves specific material compositions and manufacturing tolerances that are far harder to replicate via blueprints than pure geometry.
This deal comes exactly as the administration is trying to pivot the Iran strategy through Pakistan. If a deal with Tehran is signed this Sunday, the strategic necessity for these F-35s as a deterrence tool shifts significantly.
The concern is valid given the 5G infrastructure deals Saudi has signed with Huawei. Integrating high-end US assets into a network managed by Chinese hardware creates a permanent telemetry vulnerability.
The State Department approval includes a caveat about the modified version of the F-35. These are not the full-spec variants used by the US Air Force; they are likely stripped of some of the more sensitive electronic warfare suites.
If the aircraft are stripped of key EW suites, does that fundamentally undermine the deterrence goal against Iran? I wonder if a lite version provides enough of a capability gap to actually change Houthi behavior.
We saw the same stripped down logic with previous arms sales where the equipment arrived and lacked the necessary parts for full operational capacity. It often leads to endless maintenance contracts that keep the buyer dependent on US contractors for decades.
The modified version argument is a fairy tale. If the airframe and the basic stealth coating are there, the Chinese have everything they need to develop countermeasures.